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ARENDT’S REVISION OF PRAXIS: ON PLURALITY
AND NARRATIVE EXPERIENCE
Hannah Arendt’s relationship to phenomenology is inseparable from a
reinterpretation of philosophical sources that culminates in a compelling
vision of political life. While Arendt’s phenomenological orientation has
been noted in various scholarly works, her actual achievement testiﬁes
to a creative approach to traditional concerns that often assumes the
form of a dialogue with her more immediate intellectual predecessors.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the central role of praxis in
Arendt’s conception of the human world and the structure of political
life as a site of subjective interaction and narrative discourse. First,
Arendt’s use of Aristotle will be presented in terms of the meaning of
action as a unique philosophical category. Second, Arendt’s encounter
with the work of Martin Heidegger will be shown to involve a critical
response to his reading of Aristotle. Finally, the revised conception of
praxis that derives from her philosophical reﬂections will be related to
the experience of narrative as a necessary complement to human plurality.
I
One of Arendt’s most important contributions to philosophical discussion
concerns her insistence that the Western intellectual tradition has largely
eﬀaced the meaning of action as a unique human category. This eﬀacement
has its origins in the philosophies of both Plato and Aristotle, which in
diﬀerent ways have subordinated the active life to a predominantly con-
templative mode of being. This tendency is perhaps more clearly
announced in traditional Platonism as a basically anti-political attempt
to subordinate action to thought than it is reﬂected in Aristotle’s view of
political life. However, Arendt’s survey of Western philosophy from Plato
to Heidegger is informed by a basic insight that this tradition is largely
engaged in placing the faculty of the will under the authority of the
intellect and in denying a creative role to spontaneity and inaugural acts
in political experience. At the same time, her careful reading of Aristotle
demonstrates that the fundamental diﬀerence between praxis and poe:isis
can be used to challenge both intellectualism and the more recent philo-
sophical tendency to simply discard the will as an outmoded concept.
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Arendt’s rethinking of praxis is related to the more immediate task of
delimiting the space of the political as the public realm in which human
beings can act in concert in order to deﬁne themselves in historical terms.
In T he Human Condition, Arendt argues that the distinction between
public and private realms can be described phenomenologically as sites
in which qualitatively diﬀerent activities are organized and carried out
according to speciﬁc goals. The basis for this distinction can be traced
back to the classical belief in immortality, which can be related to the
fact that man alone is a mortal being.1 The possibility that human beings
can survive in words and deeds underlies the quest for immortality. The
space peculiar to this quest is the sphere of freedom from necessity which
in principle enables human beings to act in a common world. The private
realm, in contrast, is primarily identiﬁed with the aﬀairs of the household
and involves mastering the needs of life through economic management.
From this standpoint, Arendt can oppose the brightness of the public
realm to the relative darkness of the household. And yet, this option is
not rigid, since the public realm requires private mastery in order to
function in a secure manner. For Arendt, the term ‘public’ refers to the
world itself, which can be related to all of the enduring artifacts fabricated
by human hands and the many aﬀairs that compose human experience.2
This distinction between the two realms largely governs Arendt’s reﬂec-
tions on the Greek example, but it acquires a deeper meaning when
related to the phenomenon of action as clariﬁed in the ethical and political
writings of Aristotle. The failure of modern society to maintain the auton-
omy of the political was no doubt the occasion that motivated Arendt to
return to classical precedent in clarifying the diﬀerence between praxis
and poe:isis, or action and making. In blurring this diﬀerence, modern
society begins to replace the political realm of freedom with an instrumen-
talist culture that predicates utility as the highest value. For Arendt, this
unfortunate development is no accident but becomes the late expression
of basic tendencies that were implicit in Western metaphysics from the
outset. Aristotle’s concept of actuality (energeia) pertains to all activities
that do not pursue an extrinsic end and that leave no work behind. Such
activities do not operate in terms of the categories of means and ends,
since ‘‘the means to achieve the end would already be the end,’’ and the
end cannot be viewed as instrumental to some higher goal.3 Arendt’s
conception of politics as basically performative is based on a qualitative
distinction between purposive action and productive activity that is
Aristotelian in origin.
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Moreover, the Aristotelian background to Arendt’s conception of praxis
is political and ethical at once. On the political side, Aristotle deﬁned the
active life as one that is composed of various deeds demonstrating the
ontological superiority of the free citizen to both the craftsman and the
laborer.4 On the ethical side, Aristotle contrasts productive activity and
moral choice in view of a diﬀerence in what determines the purpose of
the matter at hand. Productive activity is structured in terms of an end
that exceeds the means required to bring about a speciﬁc result. In
contrast, moral activity demonstrates how ‘‘that which is or may be done
is an end in itself, because acting well is an end in itself,’’ rather than a
means for producing an autonomous object.5 Aristotle grounds his politi-
cal conception of citizenship in an ontological distinction between two
modes of activity that are qualitatively diﬀerentiated. Hence, just as moral
actions contain purposes that are immanent to their realization in time,
the responsible citizen participates in public life as both a free agent and
as a member of a particular community.
Arendt also follows Aristotle in arguing that political life depends on
deliberate speech, which presupposes human plurality and ﬁgures as the
essential element in the formation of a common world. Aristotle empha-
sizes how practical wisdom ( phronesis) is less concerned with the means
for securing the good than with the capacity for determining what is
good for both the individual and the community. Arendt conceives of the
public realm as shared space in which debate enables us to move from
opinion to deliberative action. However, the public realm is not the
product of an ideal project that constitutes political life in advance.
Whatever action is undertaken in the public realm ‘‘corresponds to the
human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the
earth and inhabit the world.’’6 In developing the possibility of a stable
world, the public realm that presupposes this plural structure ultimately
requires a ‘‘worldly’’ background that constitutes a relatively secure basis
for agreement among equals. Aristotle’s concept of the polis as the public
sphere in which words and deeds acquire historical meaning within the
perspective of time underlies this conception of public order.
In response to an on-going reduction in stability of meaning, Arendt
challenges modern ‘world alienation’ and the demotion of appearances
that generally accompanies the decline of the public realm as the space
where performance can acquire political meaning. On the one hand,
Arendt identiﬁes the permanence of the world with the worldliness of the
work of art in contending that ‘‘works of art are the most intensely
worldly of all tangible things’’ since they are not subject to speciﬁc uses
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and therefore exist at a remove from the damaging power of nature.’’7
On the other hand, the work of art in its worldliness can only be grasped
apart from the natural attitude. Hence, from the phenomenological stand-
point, the quasi-objective status of the work of art is only meaningful in
relation to the worldhood of the world. Moreover, Arendt’s concept of
world acquires historical signiﬁcance within the framework of an incipient
modernity. Loss of the world, rather than concern for the self, typiﬁes
the modern age, which has known unprecedented instability.8 In such a
situation, Arendt emphasizes that the continuing existence of the world
presupposes the possibility of verbal communication through which
human deeds can be assigned historical meanings. Furthermore, the
potential unity of words and deeds can only be realized in a public world
that testiﬁes to the power of appearances to suggest human plurality. In
this context, Aristotle’s notion of energeia acquires the genuinely perform-
ative meaning of designating activities that cannot be understood in terms
of ends that are extrinsic to them.9
At the same time, Arendt’s appropriation of Aristotle presupposes a
radical critique of classical teleology as applied to the formation of the
political sphere with respect to ﬁnal causality. The Aristotelian distinction
between poe:isis and praxis allows us to separate the political sphere from
the sphere of production. However, Aristotle’s concept of cause underlies
his insistence on the capacity of happiness to order the political com-
munity in terms of an ultimate goal. While this goal may seem to be a
reasonable one, it nonetheless deﬁnes the public realm teleologically in a
way that tends to reduce the signiﬁcance of human action to an instrumen-
talist horizon. In contrast, Arendt’s conception of the human community
as originally plural is not only consistent with her interpretation of Greek
political experience, but it also suggests a view of political life that departs
from the dominant tradition of Western metaphysics, beginning with
Platonic epistemology but continuing in the moral and political views of
Aristotle.
Arendt’s strong resistance to a teleological conception of politics dis-
tances her position from traditional Aristotelianism and also demonstrates
the modernity of her political orientation. In foregrounding freedom as
a central political value, Arendt reaﬃrms the diﬀerence between the public
realm and the relatively natural realm of the household. The deepening
of this diﬀerence ultimately enables her to emphasize the performative
aspect of political life, since the meaning of our ability to retain a commit-
ment to the future is irreducible to naturalistic premises. Arendt’s identiﬁ-
cation of politics with performativity largely explains her defense of Kant
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against both Aristotle and Hegel, since the distinction between reason
and intellect prevents us from elevating theory over practice.10 However,
from a more traditional point of view, Arendt’s attempt to recover the
signiﬁcance of praxis has the disturbing implication of aligning her
thought with a non-foundational conception of political life in which
freedom has the highest value.11
In truth, Arendt’s appropriation of the Aristotelian distinction between
poe:isis and praxis and the post-Kantian emphasis on the performative
nature of political life are aspects of her late modernity. At the same time,
a careful examination of her thought demonstrates an original grappling
with philosophical problems that cannot be solved within the conven-
tional parameters of modern discourse. It is evident that Arendt’s reading
of Aristotle is appreciative of something that the philosophical tradition
has generally concealed in its tendency to privilege the contemplative
over the active life. Moreover, Arendt not only rejects Aristotle’s teleology
but develops an understanding of action that also escapes instrumentalist
versions of politics that tend to be predominant in early modern times.
Hence, since Arendt is neither entirely at one with Aristotelian formula-
tions nor willing to endorse the continuation of means-ends rationality
in modern political theory, we must now turn to the question of her
indebtedness to phenomenology and the more precise nature of her
contribution to contemporary thought.
II
Arendt’s conception of politics, while deeply linked to a renewal of tradi-
tional sources, presupposes a critical and productive encounter with the
work of Martin Heidegger, whose interpretation of Aristotle constitutes
a major advance in the scholarly reception of ancient Greek philosophy.
This encounter should not he confused with mere discipleship. It can be
examined descriptively in terms of Heidegger’s words on the ﬁnitude of
being, the disclosive nature of human existence, the dualistic character of
everyday life, and the spatial ambience of there-being (Dasein). This same
encounter can be approached on a deeper level as an attempt to raise
existential concerns to the level of political discourse. Nonetheless, we
must not assume that Arendt’s appropriation of Heideggerian themes
along political lines has ceased to be phenomenological. Arendt is pro-
foundly interested in the meaning of the political, rather than the simple
transposition of philosophical ideas into a political idiom.
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Arendt was signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by Heidegger’s detailed commen-
taries on Aristotle’s philosophy, which were developed prior to the publi-
cation of Sein und Zeit in 1927. A lecture series on Aristotle, presented
at Freiburg University in 1921/22 and later published under the title
Pha¨nomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotles, is largely concerned
with the category of life as an existential and ontological concern. In this
important early text, Heidegger explores the meaning of motility and care
in terms of everyday life, and thus anticipates the entire problematic of
his middle period. Moreover, the concepts of ‘life’ and ‘world’ are said to
be related in a way that ‘‘is actualized, lived, and, as lived, preconceptually
intended for the interpretation.’’12 In this situation, phenomenological
interpretation refers us back to the facticity of life as its motive and
justiﬁcation: ‘‘This facticity is something life is, and whereby it is, in its
highest authenticity.’’13 Hence the theme of ﬁnitude already performs a
crucial role in Heidegger’s early work, which emphasizes the non-totaliz-
ing aspects of life experience that emerge in an examination of our
practical insertion in the world. Heidegger looks forward to Arendt’s view
of Aristotle as oﬀering a partial alternative to the neglect of praxis that
dominates traditional metaphysics.
Arendt’s reading of Aristotle was more directly inﬂuenced by
Heidegger’s lectures on Plato’s Sophist, which she attended at Marburg
University in 1924/25. In this context, Heidegger oﬀers a detailed analysis
of Nichomachean Ethics, Book VI, in which Aristotle identiﬁes diﬀerent
forms of knowing with corresponding forms of being. It is clear that
Arendt’s emphasis on the distinction between praxis and poe:isis could be
traced back to her initial response to these lectures. Nonetheless,
Heidegger’s lectures lack an extended discussion of Aristotle’s practical
philosophy, which provides us with a clear understanding of how the
realization of virtue constitutes the basis for the political community as
a whole. Hans-Georg Gadamer, like Arendt, was evidently disturbed that
additional lectures prepared during the same period construe phronesis
in entirely ontological terms and that the notion of ‘ethos’ is never
mentioned in them.14 Heidegger’s omission of crucial political aspects of
Aristotle’s argument no doubt provided Arendt with an incentive for
developing her own interpretation of Aristotle along diﬀerent lines.
Heidegger’s lectures on Plato’s Sophist are therefore important to
Arendt’s recovery of Aristotle and also to her critical response to what
was ultimately identiﬁed with a mistaken interpretation. On the one hand,
Heidegger’s discussion of speech in this context provides a basis for
clarifying the meaning of human disclosiveness. The experience of seeing
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is formalized in this account in terms of an ontology of human Dasein.
Seeing is open to the world, but the world itself is characterized by
‘‘uncovering which consists in wresting the being from its closedness and
covering-over.’’15 However, just as Heidegger acknowledges the power of
speech to unveil the things themselves, he also identiﬁes classical philoso-
phy with the struggle against recurrent opinions as a central concern of
the quest for truth.16While responding in a positive manner to Heidegger’s
insights into the disclosive nature of human existence, Arendt does not
interpret the meaning of disclosure according to her predecessor’s assump-
tions concerning the ultimately apolitical nature of truth.
The diﬀerence between Heidegger and Arendt on the issue of disclosive
existence is crucial to an understanding of a basic disagreement that
cannot be philosophically evaded. It is true that Heidegger, particularly
in Sein und Zeit, rejects the classically Platonic identiﬁcation of appear-
ance with deception as such. Appearance is conceived phenomenologically
as a positive term. Both Arendt and Heidegger interpret Being itself in
terms of appearing. However, while Heidegger locates the being of Dasein
in appearance, Arendt connects the appearance of the individual to public
manifestation.17 For Heidegger, the appearance of Dasein is the exclusive
concern of a being whose ownmost possibility ranges beyond all other
possibilities of being. In contrast, Arendt’s view of appearances presumes
a conscious attempt to surpass the limitations of a strictly private exis-
tence. Both interpretations derive from readings of classical texts, particu-
larly Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, but the diﬀerence between them
ultimately derives from a fundamental disagreement concerning the order
of theory and practice.
This disagreement underlies the diﬀerent conceptions of world that
enable us to assess Heidegger and Arendt as phenomenologists. The
concept of world that lies at the heart of Sein und Zeit is proposed as an
alternative to Cartesian epistemology. However, the world is only revealed
within the context of an instrumental complex that has ceased to function
according to an established agenda.18 During his middle period,
Heidegger provides the concept of world with greater solidity in identi-
fying it with the more enduring properties of the work of art. Our access
to the work is said to occur on the basis of an ontology that enables us
to identify the truth of art with poetic interpretation.19 In both cases,
however, what is missing is a clear indication of how the world concept
can be linked to public modes of experience that invoke intersubjectivity
and preserve human plurality in changing contexts. Hence, in arguing
that the use of language cannot be dissociated from political life, Arendt
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implicitly criticizes Heidegger’s more narrowly philosophical argument
that speech is originally the site of truth rather than the occasion for
human plurality.20
Arendt’s concept of world is therefore intimately linked to the domain
of praxis and the realm of interpersonal experience that cannot be located
in an isolated self. While the object-world has relative durability, we only
experience the world as real to the degree that it appears through the
presence of others. The world is constituted as a public space that guaran-
tees shared meanings: ‘‘To be deprived of this space means to be deprived
of reality, which, humanly and politically speaking, is the same as appear-
ance.’’21 Arendt cites Aristotle’s identiﬁcation of appearance with Being
in maintaining that the absence of this appearing world reduces human
experience to the ontological status of a dream. It could be argued,
therefore, that Arendt confronts solipsism as a political problem in
arguing that the shrinking of public space, which coincides with a reduc-
tion in what passes for meaning in the realm of appearances, is a precondi-
tion for the dissolution of personal meaning that brings about a radical
loss of contact between self and world.
Arendt’s conception of everyday life also refers back to Heidegger, just
as it involves a radical inversion of existential priorities as previously set
forth in Sein und Zeit. In a special study, Jacques Taminiaux has expressed
the view that the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity is
an appropriation of the classical distinction between praxis and poe:isis.22
What this means is that the true possibilities of Dasein cannot be realized
unless our more limited engagements with the world are transformed into
guiding insights. However, the context of transformation is conceived in
Sein und Zeit in private, rather than public, terms. The public world of
the ‘they-self ’ is basically inauthentic since it resists the insights that
constitute Dasein on the highest level.23 Arendt, in contrast, argues that
the relatively objective world of work is not yet a public world because
it obscures the diﬀerence between meaning and utility.24 The way out of
this apparent impasse is a recovery of praxis, which must be understood
in political terms as the conscious attempt to perceive the world under
an unfamiliar aspect. Arendt therefore understands world disclosure as
the realization of meaning through speech and action, rather than as a
unique achievement of solitary insight.25 The possibility of initiating new
actions under conditions of plurality provides the ‘space’ in which disclo-
sure can occur.
Finally, Arendt’s entire conception of ‘there-being’ both recalls that of
Heidegger and presupposes a radical re-thinking of what was initially
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presented in apolitical terms. In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger discusses the
site of Dasein as a simple ‘thereness’ that constitutes the condition for the
possibility of truth. However, truth in this case is not identiﬁed with
public space but with the space of an occasion enabling being to emerge
as unconcealedness. During his middle period, Heidegger will more
strongly identify truth with the polis as the space of the world where a
struggle occurs between withdrawal and disclosure. However, the quest
for truth is not linked to the public realm in an essential way during
either phase of his work. Arendt seizes upon this basic deﬁciency in order
to call attention to how the phenomenon of plurality is eclipsed in favor
of a more individualistic mode of understanding in the analysis of Dasein.
Heidegger’s subsequent exploration of disclosure in collective terms does
not challenge the recourse to the self that underlies his ontology. For
Arendt, therefore, there-being indicates that plurality is a condition for
public life and that it also cannot be interpreted in the light of a productive
teleology. Nevertheless, having demonstrated that Arendt both returns
to Heidegger and criticizes his neglect of praxis, we must now examine
how the political realm can be related to connected meanings that allow
for public disclosure but remain impervious to the narrower objectives
of a purely theoretical reason.
III
Arendt’s conception of the political can be explored phenomenologically
in terms of philosophy and the vital issues that it opens up on the margins
of metaphysics. On the one hand, the classical distinction between praxis
and poe:isis is once again operative in Arendt’s criticism of the classical
notion of theoria. The traditional substitution of making for acting
emerges early in Western metaphysics when Plato sharply distinguishes
knowledge and opinion. The dominance of theory over practice continues
in Aristotle’s philosophy, which ultimately instates a teleological inter-
pretation of political life. On the other hand, while oﬀering a critique of
metaphysics, Arendt also retrieves the structural signiﬁcance of action as
a testimony to plurality and as a key to narrative experience. The irreduc-
ibility of action to making becomes a rejoinder to all philosophies that
reify our relationship to the past. Moreover, this possibility of new begin-
nings introduces a degree of instability into political life that cannot be
assigned a purely theoretical meaning.
From the phenomenological standpoint, human action is embedded in
a network of relations that are never constituted on a permanent basis.26
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Arendt argues strongly that actions are never undertaken in a condition
of complete isolation. Doing not only entails responsibilities but impli-
cates the actor in an unending process that inevitably results in personal
suﬀering. Furthermore, the frailty of human institutions and laws has less
to do with human nature than with the condition of natality, which
allows new members to be introduced into a community that must be
perpetually reconstituted.27 This possibility of perpetual renewal runs
counter to the physical boundaries and legal constraints that provide
communities with relative security. Human action is essentially groundless
in the sense of being indeterminate in its scope and consequences. The
person who acts may be surprised to learn the meaning of a given set of
activities long after they are completed.
In turning away from teleological accounts of human action, Arendt
enables us to distinguish the space of appearances as the background to
human intentions from the public realm as a place of genuine order. This
space has precedence in time and occasion to what is articulated in
overtly political terms. Hence Arendt contrasts the objective interests that
bind people together in common purposes to the subjective ‘in-between’
that cannot be assimilated to practical results. The more evanescent
reality is closely related to the process of acting and speaking that consti-
tutes political life: ‘‘We call this reality the ‘web’ of human relationships
indicating by the metaphor its somewhat intangible quality.’’28 Actions
invariably occur in an intersubjective context that ‘produces’ the stories
that bear witness to personal meaning. Arendt emphasizes the anonymous
character of these stories in order to maintain that the agent does not
produce them.29 There is a rift between the ‘living reality’ that the agent
endures and the product that commemorates what has occurred in time.
Arendt clearly recognizes that, since most actions occur in language,
the space of appearance provides a basis for recounting memorable deeds
in terms of connected meanings. On the other hand, the stories that are
related to lived history are meaningful as expressions of memorable words
and deeds. However, the intricate web of human relations in which stories
have a place does not foreclose detachment from the here and now. The
gap between lived and narrated history can be understood in terms of a
temporal diﬀerence that enables the historian to function in the mode of
a reﬂective spectator.30 A genuine narrative reveals the ontological signi-
ﬁcance of an agent whose words and deeds only acquire meaning in
retrospect. The role of memory in preserving this meaning refers us back
to the originally ‘poetic’ nature of all story-telling. From this standpoint,
Aristotle’s view that literature is more philosophical than history can be
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freshly interpreted since the diﬀerence between literature and history does
not exclude a common use of the imagination.31Moreover, literature and
history as kindred disciplines can be related in diﬀerent ways to the
centrality of praxis to narrative experience.
The example of drama demonstrates the unique capacity of narrative
to become integrated into action and also to express itself as action.
Arendt notes that the revelation of character is ‘‘so indissolubly tied to
the living ﬂux of acting and speaking that it can be ‘reiﬁed’ only through
a kind of relation or mimesis,’’ and, in this manner, elevates drama to a
singular status among the arts.32 Drama imitates action, rather than
character, in presenting ‘‘the living ﬂux of action and speech’’ through an
organized plot. Drama is not only a surprisingly political art but provides
the sole artistic basis for transforming the political sphere into art.
Moreover, drama is concerned with man’s relationship to others and
therefore returns us to the condition of plurality that underlies praxis
in general.
The connection between plurality and narrative meaning that emerges
in Arendt’s political philosophy is a vital contribution to the future of
phenomenology.33 While following Aristotle in distinguishing poe:isis and
praxis, Arendt adopts a uniquely modern conception of the political
sphere as both autonomous and free. The role of action in human experi-
ence is related to both story-telling and narrative history. While distin-
guishing lived history from standard forms of cultural documentation,
Arendt provides a basis for both deconstructing oﬃcial history and
preventing lived history from being separated from objective experience.
The key to both deconstruction and potential integration is the open
nature of the political realm, that is to say, the plural structure of commu-
nal life. If lived experience did not compose a textual site in which story-
telling can proceed in a politically undirected manner, the realm of
constituted political meanings would overwhelm human plurality as a
unique space of verbal exchange. If lived experience could not bear a
signiﬁcant relation to objective interests that provide communities with
directions and motivations, the spoken and written tales which function
as vital expressions of human plurality would cease to have genuine
narrative signiﬁcance.
For all of these reasons, Arendt’s conception of drama enables us to
grasp the kinship between literature and history as the point of contact
between performativity and political meaning in the broadest sense.
Arendt’s interpretation of drama is basically Aristotelian but it also calls
attention to an intangible dimension that opens onto the meaning of
WILLIAM D. MELANEY476
what is being imitated. This meaning dwells in the larger space of appear-
ances that is plural in nature, just as it enables us to imagine how the
more limited meanings peculiar to the performative dimension can acquire
political signiﬁcance when linked to the broader community of objective
interests. The diﬀerence between poe:isis and praxis becomes more diﬃcult
to sustain once literature itself can be associated with a form of mimesis
that is coextensive with patterned human activities that constitute every-
day life. This association is less concerned with ultimate human objectives
than it is with the simple fact of being together, which constitutes a
starting-point for whatever can freely happen within the political realm.
Hence, in passing beyond traditional readings of Aristotle as well as the
theoretical bias of modern philosophy, Arendt develops a revised concept
of praxis that indicates why an original sense of plurality remains impor-
tant to whatever political future can be achieved in historical time.
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Ontology (Albany: Sate University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 111–143.
23 Heidegger, Being and T ime, pp. 118–22.
24 Arendt, T he Human Condition., p. 155.
25 Dana Villa emphasizes the un-Heideggerian features inherent in Arendt’s relocation of
authentic disclosedness in opinion and talk, which were marginalized in Sein und Zeit:
‘‘Authentic disclosedness is identiﬁed with a particular worldly activity – political action –
and this activity is seen as having a ‘proper location in the world,’ namely, the public sphere.’’
Cf. Dana Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: T he Fate of the Political (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996), p. 140. From this standpoint, individuation is an event that occurs
under conditions of plurality and requires the public space of performances in order to be
fully realized.
26 Taminiaux argues that Husserl can be credited with rehabilitating the perceived as
phenomenal presence, but that he overlooked the importance of plurality in maintaining a
conception of action that invariably depends on a uniﬁed center. Cf. Taminiaux, T he
T hracian Maid and the Professional T hinker, pp. 30–44. This mixed legacy would seem to
compromise the value of phenomenology for an understanding of Arendt’s work. However,
phenomenology is not only concerned with ego constitution but also with the limit condi-
tions that deepen the meaning of words and deeds. Action in this sense is part of an open
world that is irreducible to the parameters of teleological rationality.
27 Arendt, T he Human Condition, p. 191.
28 Ibid., p. 183.
29 Ibid., p. 184.
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30 Hannah Arendt discusses the importance of the spectator as an aesthetic category in
L ectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992),
pp. 55–65.
31 Aristotle argues that the poet is concerned with possibility rather than with actuality.
Moreover, poetry is ‘‘more philosophical and more signiﬁcant than history,’’ since it is related
to the universal rather than the individual. Aristotle, Poetics (Tallahassee: Florida State
University Press, 1981), IX, 1461b, p. 17. While Aristotle on the one hand argues that poetry
and history are quite diﬀerent, he also indicates that poetry (as the order of mimesis in the
strict sense) contains an unﬁnished meaning that brings it closer to living praxis than what
the historian oﬀers through more factual accounts of action. In a similar way, Arendt’s
conception of meaningful action could be communicated through literature as well as histori-
cal writing, since it would more deeply testify to the event of plurality in human communities
than would the mere depiction of what happened in an earlier time.
32 Arendt, T he Human Condition, p. 187.
33 Arendt goes beyond Heidegger’s conception of language as the locus of truth in empha-
sizing the political signiﬁcance of narrative. Narrated action, rather than the disclosure of
truth through verbal experience, relates human beings to the conditions of plurality and
unfolds in the political space that can be grasped historically. Narrative provides the basis
for political life and ‘dismantles’ the origin in dispersing otherness through an inﬁnity of
narrations. Cf. Julia Kristeva, Hannah Arendt: L ife Is a Narrative (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2001), p. 27.
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